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WHAT HAPPENED?: U.S. DISTRICT COURT RULES
CERCLA NOT RETROACTIVE AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE




Congress great power to enact
legislation that determines the rights and
obligations of people in a wide variety
ofareas. A first consideration with any
new legislation is whether Congress
intended the statute to apply to conduct
completed before the statute's
enactment.2 There exists a strong
presumption against applying statutes
retroactively absent a clear statement
from Congress. 3 Courts have not
required an affirmative statement in a
statute before applying the statute
retroactively.' Instead, courts have
relied on factors including the statute's
purpose and scheme, express and non-
express statutory language, and
legislative history to infer congressional
intent that a statute is to be applied
retroactively.'
A second consideration when
Congress enacts a statute is whether
Congress has the authority under the
Constitution to regulate a specific area
of law Congress often relies on its
broad grant of Commerce Clause'
power to enact legislation covering
intrastate conduct which substantially
affects interstate commerce.
A federal district judge in
Alabama recently exercised his authority
to examine an act of Congress to
determine its retroactivity and its validity
under the Constitution.' He exercised
this authority as he examined an
important and often controversial
statute, the Comprehensive
Environmental Response.
Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA").8
II. Facts and Holding
The United States brought a
CERCLA action against the Olin
Corporation ("Olin"),' which operates
a chemical plant in McIntosh,
Alabama."o The complaint alleged that
there were two actionable sites on 1500
acres of land at Olin's McIntosh plant
site." The action. however. involved
only the first of the two sites located on
the Olin property. ' The government
alleged that the operation of the plants
located on the site resulted in the release
of two hazardous substances. mercury
and chloroform. '1 Most of the
contamination occurred prior to the
effective date of CERCLA. December
11. 1980.14
The parties signed a proposed
'927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996), ,ev d, 107 F.3d 1506 (11 " Cir. 1997).
'For an excellent discussion of the retroactivity doctrine and a proposal for a new framework for retroactivity analysis, see Jill E. Fisch,
Retroactivitv and Legal Change: An EquilibriunApproach, 110 IARv. L. REV. 1055 (1997).
'Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1497 (1994). See also Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Boniorno, 494 U.S. 827
(1990); Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. *477, *503 (N.Y 1811) (stating that "[i]t is a principle of the English common lav, as ancient as the
law itself, that a statute, even of its omnipotent parliament, is not to have a retrospective clTect"); Smead, The Rule. Against Retroactive
Legislation: A Basic Principle ofJurispnudence, 20 MINN. I.. REV. 775 (1936).
'Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1501. See also Bradley v. Richmond School Bd.. 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974).
'Ohio v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Nevada v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 691 (D. Nev. 1996).
'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
'Olin, 927 F. Supp. 1502.
'See United States v. Shell, 605 F. Supp. 1064,1068 (D. Colo. 1985). CERCLA was enacted in 1980 to establish a system of liability to
promote the clean up ofhazardous substances in the environment, and provide for compensation costs incurred in responding to the damage
ofnatural resources.
'Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1503.
1d.
"Id. at 1504. "Site 1" includes 20 acres on the southern edge of the property on which an active chemical production facility operates. "Site
2" includes 62 acres which forms a natural basin exist of the plant.
1Id. The government plans to file a separate action for the alleged violations at Site 2. It contended that Olin directed surface runoff
containing hazardous materials into Site 2 which discharges in the Tombighee River.
"Id. To the extent the plants operated after CERCLA's effective date and to the extent that the threat of continuing releases from Site I
continued, the government also sought to recover cleanup costs from Olin for post-enactment conduct. In 1978, Olin built a diaphram-cell
caustic-soda/chlorine plant which itcurrentlyoperates. 'there isno allegation in the complaint that this plant is responsible for the contaminants
in Site 1.
"Id. To the extent the plants operated after CERCIA's effective date and to the extent that the threat of continuing releases from Site I
continued, the government also sought to recover cleanup costs from Olin for post-enactment conduct. In 1978, Olin built a diaphrmm-cell
caustic-soda/chlorine plant which itcurrently operates. lhere is no allegation in the complaint that this plant is responsible for the contaminants
in Site 1.
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consent decree which was filed with the
complaint." The consent decree held
the defendant liable for all expenses
associated with cleaning up the site. 16
The defendant indicated to the trial court
it had entered into the consent decree
with reservations concerning its legality,
but felt the most pragmatic solution to
the problem was to go along with what
the EPA wanted.'7 The court stressed
its duty to examine the consent decree:
"Notwithstanding the initial willingness
of the defendant to enter into a
"consent" decree, this court has a duty
to examine a consent decree not only to
determine whether its factual and legal
determinations are reasonable, but also
to ensure that the decree does not violate
the Constitution. a federal statute. or the
controlling jurisprudence." "
The defendant also raised the
issue of CERCLA's retroactivity.'9
arguing that Congress did not intend for
CERCLA to be retroactive, and that if
it did, it is a violation of the Due Process
Clause and is unconstitutional because
it delegates legislative power to the
EPA.20 In addition, the court requested
briefs from the parties to address
whether CERCLA. as applied in the
present case, was consistent with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Commerce Clause.2 '
The court dismissed the action
holding that Congress did not express
its intent that the liability provision of
CERCLA be retroactive," and that the
application of CERCLA to the facts of




1. Retroactivity of CERCLA prior
to Landgraf
One of the earliest decisions
addressing CERCLA's retroactivity was
Ohio v. Georgeoff24 The main question
facing the court was whether Congress
had overridden the presumption against
applying CERCLA retroactively." The
court began its analysis by recognizing
that as a general rule courts do not favor
the retroactive application of statutes
because of problems associated with
fairness and lack of notice. 6 The court.
however, stressed that if the language
of a statute is plain and unambiguous.
the duty of the court is to enforce it
according to its terms. 7
Ohio argued that CERCLA's
retroactivity could be inferred from
certain statutory language.2 8
Specifically. Ohio directed the court's
attention to the phrase in § 9607(a)(4)
that liability extends to "any person who
accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport."2 Ohio argued
that the future tense verb "accepts"
referred to conduct after CERCLA's
enactment 30 and that the past tense verb
"accepted" must apply to conduct
before enactment.'
The court disagreed with
Ohio's analysis. The court noted that
'Id. at 1505.
'
6 d. The court noted that the EPA estimated the cost ofcompliance at $10,339,000. The EPA, in its record ofdecision, set forth additional
requirements that Olin must perforn: "(1) pump and treat additional ground water, (2) upgrade and extend the existing caps over closed
portions of Site 1, (3) increase monitoring of ground water, and (4) establish certain institutional controls."
171.
"Id. at 1506. The court also noted that Olin had committed itself to satisfying the requirements of the consent decree regardless of the court
decision. However, Olin wished to fulfill those requirements under the direction of the Alabama Department ofEnvironental Management,
rather than the EPA.
9 Id.
20M.
"Id. The court was referring to the Supreme Court's holding in Uhnited States i Lopez.
22Id at 1503.
231d.
562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983). Ohio brought an action under CERCLA to collect costs related to cleaning up a hazardous waste
site. One of the defendants, Brovning-Ferris Industries (13FI) argued that a presumption against the retroactive application of statutes
exists and nothing in the language or legislative history of CERCLA overcame that presumption. Id. at 1302. For articles discussing
CERCLA, retroactivity, and Georgeoff see Stephan B. Presser, Thwrting The Killing ofthe Cotpomtion: LinitedLiabilitv Democracy
and Economics, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 148 (1992); 70 A.L.R. FED. 329 (1984).
"Geotgeof, 562 F. Supp. at 1308. The court noted that procedural and remedial statutes have always been exempted from the general rule
and have been applied retroactively. Ohio sought to bring CERCLA within this exception. The court rejected the cases cited by Ohio in
support ofthis argument including Houmvd it Allen, 368 F Supp. 310 (D.S.C. 1973), off'd without opinion 487 F.2d 1397 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 912 (1974); Bagsarian v. ParkerAletal Co., 282 F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
261d. (citing J. Sutherland, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONsTRucTioN, § 41.04 (4th ed. 1975)).
"Id. at 1309. (citing Judge Sirica from frinisor iv State Fam Insurance Co., 509 F. Supp. 342 (D.D.C. 1981)).
28Id. at 1309.
29 d. at 1309-1310.
'
0 d. at 1310.
3Id. The court noted in n. 10 that "[tIhe somewhat confiLsed legislative development of the phrase "accepts or accepted" weakens the force
of Ohio's argument." Id. In the Senate report on S. 1480, the Senate version of CERCILA, this provision of the statute read "any person
MELPR 171
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there is no future tense verb in §
9607(a)(3). only past tense." Thus, the
court concluded that under Ohio's
analysis § 9607(a)(3) could not apply
to present or future conduct. a result
which Congress could not have
intended." The court held that a more
proper view was to read "accepts or
accepted" from the perspective of a
release." By "construing the phrase
accepts or accepted from the time of
release, the word "accepted" will apply
to all impositions of liability under
CERCLA." 3
In addition, the court reviewed
other provisions to determine whether
CERCLA applied to pre-enactment
conduct. 6 The court stated. "CERCLA
frequently refers to 'inactive' waste
disposal sites. thereby indicating
Congressional intent to focus on past.
rather than future conduct."" The court
also noted that. "CERCLA authorizes
reimbursements from the Superfund for
response costs arising before CERCLA's
enactment. indicating that at least some
of the provisions of CERCLA apply
retroactively."" Finally. the court
stressed that, "§ 9607(f)'s prohibition on
recovery for injuries to natural resources
occurring before CERCLA's enactment
suggests. by implication that a similar
prohibition does not apply to other
response costs. "39 Despite these
provisions. the court was still unwilling
to declare that the presumption against
retroactivity had been overcome.o
The court then examined the
legislative history of CERCLA."' The
court held that a general examination of
the debates indicated Congressional
intent to effect the complete clean up of
existing hazardous waste facilities. 2
After considering all of the indications
of legislative intent, the court concluded
there was sufficient evidence of
Congressional intent to make
CERCLA's liability provisions apply
who accepts any hazardous substances for transport." S.Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d. Scss. 31 (1980). The words "or accepted"do not
appear in this report and do not appear in the Senate version of CERCLA until much later, when they were incorporated into a substitute
form of the bill. See Cong.Rec. S 14,719 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1980). At that time, the addition of the words "or accepted" passed unnoticed-
hardly the response which would be expected if Congress attached any significance to the addition." Id.





"Id. at n. 13. The court offered other support: See e.g. Preamble to CERCLA (purpose of CERCLA is "to provide for... the clean up of
inactive hazardous waste disposal sites"); 42 U.S.C. 9601(2OXa)(iii) ("in the case of any abandoned facility..."); H. REP. Nn. 1016, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I at 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.S.C.A.N. at 6119, 6125 ("It is the intent of the Conunittees...[to] establish a
comprehensive response and financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous
waste disposal sites."). Id.
38Id.
3
'1d. The court discussed this provision in n. 15. In relevant part, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) provides that "[there shall be no recovery... Ifor
damages to natural resources] where such damages and the release of a hazardous substance from which such damages resulted have
occurred wholly before December 11, 1980." Ohio argued that, by implication, the reverse is true; liability will be imposed for other
damages which occur wholly before the enactment of this act. See Note, 130 U. PA. L. REv. at 1241. As further support for its position,
Ohio argued that its reading of this provision is in accordance with the general policy of the CERCLA to provide for liability among those
individuals responsible for releases of hazardous substances. Id.
40 1.
4
'Id. at 1312. In n. 16 the court noted that the most relevant statements on this issue took place during a colloquy on the floor of the House
involving then Congressman David Stockman and Congressman Albert Gore, one ofCERCILA's sponsors. In opposition to an amendment
broadening the liability provisions of CERCLA, Congressman Stockman said, "I would like to suggest to the members of this House that
some day down the road about a year from now they are going to receive a letter from a company in their district that has just received a $5
or $10 million liability suit from EPA that was triggered by nothing more than a decision of a GS-14 that some landfill, some disposal site
somewhere, needed to be cleaned up and, as a result of an investigation that his office did, he found out that company in your district
contributed a few hundred pounds of waste to that site thirty years ago. IAnd once EPA hasI found that deep pocket, they will immediately
go to court and sue that deep pocket, and then all the onus of the law, all of the burden will be on him to prove that he was not responsible
for an outcome that occurred thirty years later as a result of this retroactive liability." CONG. Rrc. I. 9466 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980).
Congressman Stockman's position, which was also cited in the Senate debates, Id. at S.14,979 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 198()), and the popular
press, see Id., proved unpersuasive with the Members of Congress. Id.
"ld. "Senator Tsongas stated that "ftihe need for an emergency Federal nresponse to deal with abandoned waste sites and chemical spills is
real, and it is immediate." CONG. REC. S.14,973 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980). Senator Danforth also stated that "[w]e have no time to lose.
Hazardous wastes are produced daily-, we cannot put them on hold while we daily through deliberation.. .I believe the clear consensus is that
we must clean up abandoned hazardous dump sites as soon as possible..." Id. at S. 14,977. See also Id. at S.14,971 (remarks of Sen.
Bradley); Id. at S. 14,977 (remarks of Sen. Dole): Id. at S.15,003 (remarks of Sen. Leahy and Chafl'ec): Id. at S.15,007 (remarks of Sen.
Reigle); CONG. REC. H. 11,793 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980)(remarks of Rep. Vento); Id. at 11,798 (remarks of Rep. Eckhardt). h/.
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retroactively, overcoming the traditional
presumption against such an
application.
The court in United States v
Shell Oil Company" reached a similar
conclusion favoring CERCLA's
retroactive application. The defendant
in.Shell argued that CERCLA does not
apply retroactively to allow for recovery
of response costs incurred before
CERCLA's enactment." The Shell
court adopted the same principles
regarding retroactivity stated in
Georgeoff and also reached similar
conclusions regarding CERCLA's
retroactivity based on an examination of
its statutory provisions and legislative
history. 6 The Shell court added to the
analysis of CERCLA's retroactivity by
noting that "CERCLA must be
construed in light of previous statutes
relating to environmental pollution.
notably the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976("RCRA")." 47
The Shell court noted that
Congress adopted RCRA to deal with
loopholes in environmental law
regarding the disposal of hazardous
wastes on land. but soon discovered that
RCRA failed to solve all of the
environmental problems. 48 The court
found that CERCLA was enacted in
response to these shortcomings and to
provide for "the cleanup of inactive
hazardous waste disposal sites."4 9 The
court stressed that part of the problem
with RCRA was that "the Act is
prospective and applies to past sites only
to the extent that they are posing an
imminent hazard."50 In other words,
pre-CERCLA law could not stop the
ongoing environmental deterioration
from waste dumps already in existence."
The court concluded that "the
unavoidable retroactive nature of
CERCLA. and Congress' decision in
CERCLA to impose the cost ofcleaning
up hazardous waste sites on the
responsible parties rather than on
taxpayers, strongly indicates
Congressional intent to hold responsible
parties liable for pre-enactment
government response costs.""
In addition to Georgeoff and
Shell, a number of other federal
decisions have directly addressed
CERCLA's retroactivity, none of which
have declined to apply CERCLA on
retroactivity grounds."
2. Retroactivity Under Landgraf
43Id. at 1314.
44605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985). The United States filed an action against Shell under sections 104 and 107 ofCERCLA to recover
costs associated in responding to hazardous waste contamination allegedly caused by Shell at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal near Denver,
Colorado. The U.S. also sought damages for the destruction and loss of natural resources at the arsenal. Id. at 1067.
"Id. at 1068. The court noted that three district courts had reached results supporting Shell's position: United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 841-843(W.D. Mo. 1984): United States v. Wade, 20 E.R.C. 1849, 1850-51 (E.D. Pa.
March 23, 1984); United States v. Morton-Thiokol, Inc., No. 83-4787 (D. N.J. July 2, 1984). The court stressed that the Supreme Court
nor any other federal appellate court had addressed the retroactivity issue. Id. at 1069.
461d.
1Id. at 1070. See also Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. The court quotes a report on RCRA
from the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce to explain its purpose:
The Committee believes that the approach taken by this legislation eliminates the last remaining loophole in environmental law, that of
unregulated land disposal of discarded materials and hazardous wastes. Further, the Committee believes that this legislation is necessary if
other environmental laws are to be both cost and environmentally effective. At present the federal government is spending billions of
dollars to remove pollutants from the air and water, only to dispose of such pollutants on the land in an environmentally imsound manner.
The existing methods of land disposal often results in air pollution, subsurface leachate and surface run-off which affect air and water
quality. This legislation will eliminate this problem and pennit the environmental laws to function in a coordinated and effective way.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6241-42.
48Shell. 605 F. Supp. at 1070.
91d. at 1071. The court quotes from the Preamble to CERCIA. The court also quotes from the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce that is was their intent "to initiate and establish a comprehensive response and financing mechanism to abate and control the
vast problems associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites." (H-.R. REP. No. 96-1016, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess. 22,
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125 [to accompany H.R. 7020].5 Shell, 605 F. Supp. at 1071. See H. R. at 22, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6125. For other cases that recognize CERCLA was enacted in
response to the inadequacies of RCRA, see United States v. Northeastern Phannaceutical and Chemical Co., 579 F. Supp. at 839; United
States v. A & F Materials Company, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1252 (S.D.ll. 1984); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109(D. N.J.
1983); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 n. 2 (D. Minn. 1983).
s"Shell, 605 F. Supp. at 1072.
"Id. at 1073. The court noted that there are two separate, but related issues regarding CERCLA's retroactivity. The first issue is whether
parties are liable for acts conunitted before CERCLA's enactment. The second issue, presented in Shell, was whether parties are liable for
government response costs incurred before CERCLA's enactment. The court detennined that once is was established that liability based on
pre-CERCLA conduct does not offend due process, it was irrelevant, from a due process perspective, whether the government commenced
cleanup before or after CERCLA's enactment.
"Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1507. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1988): United States v. Northeastem Pharnaceutical
& Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th. Cir. 1986): HRW Systems v. Washington Gas, 823 F. Supp. 318 (D. Md. 1993); City of Philadelphia
v. Stepan Chemical, 748 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Pa. 1990) Kelly v. Solvent Col., 714 F. Supp. 1439(W.D. Mich. 1989); O'Neil v. Picillo, 682
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One of the most recent
discussions of retroactivity came in
response to questions regarding the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.14 In Landgrafv
USI Filun Products, the Court stressed
that. in dealing with the retroactivity of
a statute, there are often apparent
tensions between different canons of
statutory construction." The Court
recognized that federal courts have
struggled to reconcile two apparently
contradictory statements found in the
Court's decisions concerning the effect
of intervening changes in the law.' Each
statement is set forth as a general rule
for "interpreting statutes that do not
specify their temporal reach."" The first
rule is that, "a court is to apply the law
in effect at the time it renders its
decision."" The second rule is that
"retroactivity is not favored in the law"
and that "Congressional enactments and
administrative rules will not be
construed to have retroactive effect
unless their language requires this
result." 9  The Court found it
unnecessary to resolve this conflict in
cases where the Congressional intent is
clear.'
In the Landgraf case, the
Court concluded that the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 did not indicate any clear
expression of intent so the Court was
forced to focus on the apparent tension
between the rules set forth for dealing
with problems in the absence of
Congressional instruction.' The Court
began its discussion in Landgraf by
noting that there was no tension between
the holdings in Bradley v. Richmond
School Board and Bowen v. Georgetown
University Hospital." In Bradley. the
Court held that a statute authorizing the
award of attorney's fees to civil rights
plaintiffs applied to a case that was
pending on appeal when the statute was
enacted." In Bowen, the Court held that
the Department of Health & Human
Services did not have authority to
institute a rule that required hospitals to
refund Medicare payments for services
rendered before the enactment of the
rule." The Landgraf Court noted that
its opinion in Bowen did not purport to
overrule Bradley or limit its reach."'
Next. the Court noted that a
presumption against retroactive
legislation is deeply rooted in American
jurisprudence. 66 Indeed, the anti-
retroactivity principle is expressed in
several provisions of the Constitution.6'
The LandgrafCourt stressed, however
that the Constitution's restrictions are
F. Supp. 706 (D. R.I. 1988); United States v. Hooker Chemicals and Plastics, 680 F. Supp. 546 (W.D. N.Y 1988); United States v.
Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. 448 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Ottati and Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 1985); Town ofl1oonton
v. Drew Chemical, 621 F. Supp. 663 (D. N.J. 1985); United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985);
United States v. Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985); Jones v. Inmont, 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984); United States v.
South Carolina Recycling Disposal Co., 653 F. Supp. 984 (D. S.C. 1984); United States v. Price, 577F. Supp. 1103 (D. N.J. 1983); Ohio
v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983); United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Penn. 1982). Cf Aetna Cas & Stir. Co.,
Inc. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507 (9th Cir. 1991); O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st. Cir. 1989); In the Matter of Penn Central, 944
F.2d 164 (3rd. Cir. 1991); United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397(1). N.J. 1991).




"Id. (quoting Bradley v. Richond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696,711 (1974)).
"Id. (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 204,208 (1988)).
MId. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827,837 (1990)(where the Court held that the preijudgment interest
statute in that case evinced clear Congressional intent that it was not applicable to judgment entered before its effective date).





"Id. at 1497. See also supra note 2 and accompanying text. The Court has applied the presumption against retroactivity to a wide range
of cases, the largest group being those affecting contractual or property rights where predictability and stability are of prime importance.
See, e.g., United States v. Security Industrial 13ank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982); Claridge Apartments Co. v Commissioner, 323 U.S. 141 (1944),
rev'd., 321 U.S. 759 (1942); United States v. St. Louis, S.F. & T.R. Co., 270 U.S. I (1926) 1 Holt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 637 (1914). Union
Pacific R. Co. v Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190 (1913): Twenty Percent Cases, 20 Wall. 179 (1874); Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall.
596 (1873); Carroll v. Carroll's Lessee, 16 How 275 (1854). The notion that statutes wvill not have retroactive effect absent language
which requires that result is supported by a long line of cases. See e.g. Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149(1964); White v. U3nited
States, 191 U.S. 545 (1903); United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760 (1878) Murray v. Gibson, 15 How. 421 (1854); Ladiga v. Roland. 2
How. 581 (1849).
6 Landgraf 114 S. Ct. at 1497. The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits retroactive application of penal legislation. Article 1, § 10 cl. I
prohibits the States from passing retroactive legislation that inpairs tie obligations of contracts. The Takings Clause ofthe Fifth Amendment
prevents govemment actors from taking private property unless for public use and for just compensation. Article 1, §9-10 prohibits"Bills
of Attainder" which prohibits legislatures from singling out persons for punishment of past conduct. Finally, the Due Process Clause
protection of fair notice may be compromised by retroactive legislation. Id.
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of a limited scope.' The Court noted
that a requirement that Congress make
its intention clear helps to establish that
Congress has determined that the
benefits of retroactivity outweigh any
potential unfairness.' When deciding
if a statute operates retroactively, the
Court must ask whether the new
provision attaches legal consequences to
events that were completed before the
new provision was enacted.70 "The
conclusion that a new rule operates
retroactively comes at the end of a
process of judgment concerning the
nature and extent of the change in the
law and the degree of connection
between the operation of the new rule
and a relevant past event.""
The petitioner in Landgraf
relied primarily on Bradlevnl and Thorpe
v Housing A uthoritv of Durkham" to
support her argument that the Court's
ordinary interpretive rules support
application of § 102 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 to her case."' The Court
rested its decision in Bradley "on the
principle that a court is to apply the law
in effect at the time it renders its
decision, unless doing so would result
in manifest injustice or there is statutory
direction or legislative history to the
contrary."" Although this language
seems to favor a presumption in favor
of applying all new rules of law
retroactively. the Court in Landgraf
made it clear that Bradley did not alter
the well-settled presumption against
retroactivity. 6 The Court stressed that
the attorney's fees provision in BradleV
and the new hearing requirement in
Thorpe did not resemble the cases in
which the Court had applied the
presumption against retroactivity.7 In
none of the Court's decisions that have
relied upon Bradley or Thorpe has the
Court expressed doubt of the traditional
presumption against retroactivity. 8
The Landgraf Court set forth
a general rule for determining
retroactivity: if a case implicates a
federal statute enacted after the events
in the suit. the court's first task is to
determine whether Congress has
expressly defined the statute's reach.'9
If Congress has done so, there is no need
to look to judicial default rules." If,
however, the statute does not contain
express language, the court must
determine whether the new statute
would have retroactive effect. i.e.,
whether it would impair rights a party
possessed when he acted, increase a
party's liability for past conduct. or
impose new rules with respect to
transactions already completed.8' If the
statute would operate retroactively. the
traditional presumption is that it does
not govern absent cleari Congressional
intent that would favor such a result.?
The Landgraf Court
recognized, as the petitioner argued,
"that retroactive application of a new
statute would vindicate its purpose more
fully."" However, this consideration is
not sufficient to rebut the presumption
against retroactivity It is possible that
a legislator who supported a bill might
have opposed its retroactive
application.85 There was reason for the
Court to believe that the omission from
the 1990 version of the Civil Rights Bill
of the express retroactivity provisions
was a factor in the 1991 bill's passage."
The Landgraf Court concluded that
there was no clear evidence of
Congressional intent that § 102 of the




7'416 U.S. 696 (1974).
73393 U.S. 268(1969). In Thorpe, the Court held that an agency circular requiring a local housing authority to give notice and an opportunity
to respond before evicting a tenant was applicable to an eviction commenced before the regulation was issued.
7'Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1502.
"Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711.













B. The Validity of CERCLA under
the Commerce Clause
1. The Commerce Clause pre-Lopez.'
Article I, § 8 of the
Constitution provides that Congress
shall have the power "[tlo regulate
commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes."" The Supreme Court's
interpretations of the Commerce Clause
have helped define the scope of federal
power and the extent to which the
federal government can dictate law and
policy for the country.' In general, the
interpretation of the Commerce Clause
is examined by focusing on specific time
periods in our history.9' The period of
1888-1936 began with few restraints on
federal power." However, as case law
evolved, the Court crept toward a
concept of dual federalism." The Tenth
Amendment was used to define and limit
the powers of Congress by reserving the
regulation of some activities for the
states." In the early 1930's. the
Supreme Court battled against the New
Deal legislation and struck down major
regulations and programs because the
Court felt the Tenth Amendment
committed the regulation of such
activities to the states." The Court felt
these laws were not regulations of
interstate transportation or the "stream"
of commerce, and conclude that there
must be a direct connection between
regulated activity and interstate
commerce.%
By the early 1940s, however.
the Supreme Court began to interpret
the Commerce Clause as a broad grant
of power." The Court accepted the
proposition that the possible impact of
an activity on commerce among the
states brings it within this power." The
Court defines commerce among the
states as what concerns more states than
one." The Justices defer to legislative
choices so long as there is a rational basis
upon which Congress could find a
reasonable relation between its
regulation and commerce.'"
In 1978, in City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey.,' 0 the
Supreme Court specifically addressed
the Commerce Clause in relation to solid
waste.o2 The Court began its analysis
by noting that all objects of interstate
trade merit Commerce Clause
protection and none can be excluded
from the definition of "commerce" as a
preliminary matter.03 In striking down
a New Jersey statute prohibiting the
importation of solid or liquid waste
originated outside of New Jersey's
borders. the Court held that the banning
of even valueless waste implicates
Constitutional protection."' In response
to the New Jersey Supreme Court's
question of whether the interstate
movement of wastes was commerce
within the meaning of the Commerce
Clause the Court stated that "[any
doubts on that score should be laid to
rest at the outset." 05
2. The Commerce Clause under
Lopez"0
'Id. For recent cases discussing CERCLA's retroactivity in light ofLandgraf see The Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Fiberbond Corp., 946
F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ind. 1996); Nova Chemicals, Inc. v. GAF Corp., 945 F. Supp. (E.D. Tenn. I996), State ofNev. ex rel. Dept. ofTransp.
v. U.S., 925 F. Supp. 691 (D. Nev. 1996); Gould Inc. v. A & M Battery & Tire Service, 933 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Pa. 1996); United States
v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 1996 WL 637559 (N.D.N.Y 1996); Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Agway, Inc., 1996 WL 550128 (N.D.N.Y 1996).
"Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
'U.S. CONST. Art. I § 8.





95 d. at 145.
'Id. See, e.g., PanamaRefining Co v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter PoultryCorp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
'NOWAK, supra note 90, at 145. See also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
"NOWAK, supra note 90, at 145.
"Id.
'"Id. There are three ways for something to come under federal commerce power. First, Congress can set the regulations regarding the
permissibility of interstate travel if the law does not contravene a specific constitutional guarantee. Second, Congress can regulate any
activity, including "single state" if it has a close relationship or etfects commerce. Finally, Congress can regulate single state activities
which otherwise have no effect on commerce if the regulation is necessary and proper to regulating commerce.
0437 U.S. 617 (1978).
1'0Id.
'osId. at 621.
'"For a broad discussion of Lopez, see Donald 11. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Conintepre Power and icidentalk' Reirrite
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In Lopez. the Court once again
faced a question concerning the scope
of the Commerce Clause and the extent
to which Congress can regulate activities
of the states.' 0' The Court noted that
the modern-era precedents which have
expanded Congressional power under
the Commerce Clause confirm that
Congressional authority is subject to
outer limits." The Court concluded
that Congress may regulate intrastate
activity if it has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce." The Court
noted that is has identified three broad
categories of activities that Congress
may regulate under the Commerce
Clause."o First, Congress has the
authority to regulate the use of channels
of interstate commerce."' Second,
Congress may "regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
or persons or things in interstate
commerce, even though the threat may
come only from intrastate activities.""'
Finally. Congress has the authority to
regulate those activities that have a
substantial relation to interstate
commerce."' The Court admitted in
reference to the third category that case
law had been unclear whether an activity
must "affect" or "substantially affect"
interstate commerce in order to be valid
under the Commerce Clause."' The
Court concluded that the proper test was
to require an analysis of whether the
activity "substantially affects" interstate
commerce."' As part of the evaluation
of constitutionality under the Commerce
Clause the Court considered legislative
findings regarding the effect on interstate
commerce."' Based on this analysis.
the Court concluded that Congress had
exceeded its constitutional authority
under the Commerce Clause by enacting
the Gun-Free Schools Zone Act.""
IV. Instant Decision
1. CERCLA's Retroactivity
In United States v Olin. the
district court stressed that the issue of
CERCLA's retroactivity had not been
directly addressed by the Eleventh
Circuit. "' The court acknowledged that
other federal courts have applied
CERCLA retroactively, but noted that
these decisions were handed down prior
to the Court's decision in Landgraf "'9
The Landgrafanalysis was set forth by
the district court as the controlling
standard for determining retroactivity 210
Therefore, the Olin court
began by determining whether Congress
had expressly defined CERCLA's reach.
The court found that CERCLA contains
no language explicitly stating that it is
retroactive.'' The court also stressed
that CERCLA contains almost no
legislative history from which an intent
could be inferred.' 2 The court felt that
the lack of legislative history was
attributable to the delicate nature of the
compromise that lead to the bill's
passage. '2  The court also concluded
that the precise issue of retroactivity had
not been addressed in Congressional
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554 (1995).
'"Lopez, 115 S. Ct.. at 1626. At issue in Lopez was the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, in which Congress made it a federal offense
"for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."
Id. at 1626. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(qX I XA) (1988 ed., Supp. V). The Court held that Congress had exceeded its authority to regulate
commerce because the Act did not regulate a commercial activity nor did it contain a requirement that the possession be connected in any
way to interstate commerce. Id. at 1625.
'Id. at 1628.
'"Id. See, e.g., lodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146
(1971); Katzenback v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).






' Id at 1631. The Court noted that Congress normally is not required to make fonnal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity
has on interstate conuerce.
"'Id. at 1634. The Court concluded that § 922(q) of the Act was a criminal statute that had nothing to do with commerce. The court also
noted that "§ 922(q) contained no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession
affects interstate conunerce." Id. at 1631.
"
8Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1507. The Eleventh Circuit in dicta in isginia Properties ie. i Home Ins. Co., 74 F.3d 1131, 1132 (11th Cir.





I23 d. at 1514.
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debate.'24 "Given that the language-
express or otherwise-and the
legislative history-broadly and
narrowly understood-fail to
demonstrate a clear congressional intent
for retroactivity, Landgraf requires that
the presumption against retroactivity be
applied if the statute is one to which that
presumption applies." 25
Thus, the court next
determined whether CERCLA would
impair rights a party possessed when he
acted, increase a party's liability for past
conduct, or impose new rules with
respect to transactions already
completed. The court felt that applying
CERCLA liability retroactively was
more egregious than the compensatory
liability which the Court refused to
extend in Landgraf.126 The court
stressed that there was nothing in the
legislative history that demonstrated that
§ 107(a) and 106(a) of CERCLA were
the sorts of provisions that must be
interpreted as retroactive to render them
effective. '2  The court stated that the
decision in Georgeoff did exactly what
Landgraf disapproved. 121 In addition,
le Shell ad Northeastern
Pharmaceutical cases, which cite
Georgeoff with approval, demonstrated
little regard for the presumption against
retroactivity.2 9 For these reasons, the
court felt CERCLA, as connected to the
present case, was not retroactive."
2. Validity of CERCLA under the
Commerce Clause
The second issue that the court
addressed was the extent of
Congressional power in relation to the
Commerce Clause. The court
recognized that the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Commerce Clause
had greatly expanded over the last two
centuries.'"' The impetus for the court's
analysis was a focus on the Supreme
Court's recent decision in United States
v. Lopez. 3 2
The Olin court began its
discussion of Lopez by noting that the
majority had reopened a debate once
thought foreclosed. 33 The court agreed
with members of the dissent in Lopez
that the majority's holding was radical.134
The court restated Lopez's
categorization of the Commerce Clause
cases into three areas: 35
First, Congress may regulate
the use of the channels of
interstate commerce... Second,
Congress is empowered to
regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce,
even though the threat may
come only from intrastate
activities...Finally, Congress'
commerce authority includes
the power to regulate those
activities having a substantial
relationship to interstate
commerce.' 3 6
Like Lopez, the Olin case
involved only the third category of
cases."' The court stressed that in
discussing the third category, the
Supreme Court was not focusing on
activities which have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce, but rather
regulating economic activity which has
a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.39
The court stressed that the
Lopez Court rejected the government's
argument that the "cost of crime" and
"national productivity" placed the Gun-
Free Schools Act of 1990 within
Congress' commerce power.'" The





2Id. at 1509. "The premises for the decision in Georgeoff were disapproved in and are no longer tenable after Landgraf. As a result,
Georgeoff and the cases which rely on its analysis, -and which do not do their own analysis-cannot be considered persuasive." Id.
1291d. at 1509. The court felt that the Shell court's conclusion that CERCLA is "unavoidably retroactive" based on the general purpose and
scheme of CERCLA was not sufficient to rebut the presumption against retroactivity. "Other than its discussion of 'general purpose and
scheme,' Shell Oil does not explain precisely what overrides the presumption against retroactivity." In regards to the Northeastern case
the court stated, "the case treats the presumption itself rather lightly, devotes only one sentence to the statutory language, relies on Shell Oil







'3Id. (quoting Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30).
'
3
"Id. "In requiring that the object of the regulation, which "substantial affects" interstate commerce, must itself be "economic activity,"
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Supreme Court rejected these theories
because under such rationale Congress
could regulate any activity, regardless
of how tenuously the activities related
to interstate commerce."' The court
also felt that Lopez was noteworthy for
what it did not say.'4' The court noted
that the Supreme Court easily could
have upheld the Gun-Free Schools Act
of 1990 by holding that guns were
articles of commerce, or that Congress
had a rational basis for concluding that
the activity sufficiently affected
interstate commerce.'42 The fact that the
Supreme Court did not enforce the act
on these grounds was significant to the
Olin court.'43
In applying Lopez to
CERCLA, the court stressed that Lopez
requires, "l) that the statute itself
regulate economic activity, which
activity 'substantially affects' interstate
commerce.. .and 2) that the statute
include a jurisdictional element which
would ensure through case-by-case
inquiry that the [statute] in question
affects interstate commerce."'" The
court found it doubtful that the object
of regulation at issue in Olin was
"economic activity" or commerce, as the
terms were used in Lopez.'14 5
The court also focused on the
fact that the present suit was seeking
costs associated with the clean-up of real
property.'" The court stated, "It is clear
to this court that the law regulating real
property has been traditionally a local
matter falling under the police powerof
the states.""4 The court noted that
Congress may regulate economic
activity that falls within local police
power, but may not exercise a general
police power.'" Consequently, the court
concluded, "It appears to this court that
CERCLA generally represents an
example of the kind of national police
power rejected by Lopez." 49 However,
the court felt that it was unnecessary to
reach this conclusion because CERCLA,
as applied in the present case, failed to
meet the second criteria of Lopez."o
The court held that even if
CERCLA met the first test of regulating
intrastate economic activity which
substantially affected interstate
commerce, it must also be shown that
the statute included a "jurisdictional
element which would ensure, through
case-by-case inquiry, that the statute in
question affects interstate commerce."'
The court determined that nothing in
CERCLA provided for such an inquiry,
but even assuming there was such a
provision, the inquiry in the present case
demonstrated that the activity at issue
had virtually no effect on interstate
commerce."' The court stated:
As demonstrated in the remedial
investigative report, any
contaminants at Site I affect
groundwater mostly by migrating
through the locally-contained
alluvial aquifer. This aquifer lies
atop a miocene aquifer. The
remedial-investigation report
indicates there is little or no
migration between the two aquifers,
and there is no evidence that
contaminants at Site I travel across
state lines.'
On these grounds, the court
held that the federal government had no
constitutional authority to do what it
proposed at the site.'54 Therefore, the
court declined to sign or enter the
proposed consent decree and dismissed
the government's action with
prejudice. 5
V. Comment
The decision by the district
judge in the Olin case has created a
wealth of interest and controversy. The
Olin decision stands as the lone case
declaring both that CERCLA is not
retroactive and that it is unconstitutional
in that it violates the Commerce
Clause."'
Although the Olin court
applied Landgrafand Lopez in order to
reach his conclusions, the cases were
misapplied and the analysis of the issues
"1'Id.

















s6 At the conclusion and submission of this article the Eleventh Circuit decided the appeal of the Olin case, reversing the decision of the
district court, United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (1 I1 Cir. 1997). The Eleventh Circuit held that: (1) there was no Commerce
Clause violation in application of CERCLA and (2) CERCLA's response cost liability scheme applies retroactively to disposals occurring
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was selective and narrow.
The Olin court made much of
the fact that the case law upholding
CERCLA was handed down before the
Supreme Court's decisions in Landgraf
and Lopez.'" However, the issue of
CERCLA's retroactivity, in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Landgraf
was directly addressed in Nevada v
United States.'8  The decision in
Nevada was decided a week prior to
Olin.'" In addition, CERCLA's
constitutionality in light of the Lopez
case was evaluated in United States v.
NL Indus., Inc.'60 A comparison of these
two cases with Olin provides an
excellent framework for examining and
commenting on the weaknesses of Olin.
1. Retroactivity
In regard to retroactivity. the
major reasoning behind the Olin opinion
was a belief that CERCLA's express and
implied statutory language did not
demonstrate clear legislative intent for
retroactivity as required by Landgraf '"'
A major argument for CERCLA's
retroactivity has been that Congress did
implicitly authorize retroactive
application of CERCLA by affirmativcly
limiting retroactive application of
damages to natural resources.' This
negative implication argument was
adopted in Shell and by the Nevada
court.' The Nevada court conceded
that in Landgraf the Supreme Court
rejected the negative implication
argument asserted in that case, however.
the Nevada court stressed that Landgraf
did not preclude all future uses of a
negative inference analysis in support of
retroactive intent.' The Nevada Court
also stressed that cases like Shell applied
the traditional presumption against
retroactivity. but found sufficient
evidence of Congressional intent that
outweighed the presumption.'"
The Olin court rejected the
analysis set forth in Georgeof rShell and
Northeastern.'66 The court dismissed
the arguments that the legislative history
and non-express statutory language of
CERCLA provided enough evidence to
overcome the traditional presumption
against retroactivity.'"6 In regard to
legislative history, the Olin court simply
declared that CERCLA had almost no
legislative history.' However, this
conclusion ignored the number of
references made by members of both
political parties as highlighted in
Georgeoffand Shell. which do support
the conclusion that CERCLA was
intended to be applied retroactively.
Furthermore, the Olin court
ignored the importance of the reasons
behind CERCLA's enactment. Both the
prior to CERCLA's enactment. In regards to the Commerce Clause challenge, the court stated that Lopez did not alter the constitutional
standard for federal statutes regulating intrastate activities. The proper test is whether the regulated activity substantially affects interstate
commerce. The court also noted that Congress can maintain the constitutionality of its statutes by including ajurisdictional clement which
would ensure that the activity in question affects interstate commerce, however, when Congress fails to do so, the courts must determline
independently whether the statute regulates "activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which vicwed in the
aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce." Id., (citing Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631). The court criticized the district court's
Commerce Clause analysis for two reasons. First, the district court indicated that Lopez requires a statute to regulate economic activity
directly to satisfy the Commerce Clause. However, under Lopez. a statute will satisfy the Constitution if it regulates an activity, whatever
its nature, "that arise[s] out of or [is] connected with a conunercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate
commerce." 115 S. Ct. at 1631. The court also rejected the district court's conclusion that Lopez requires every statute to contain a
jurisdictional statement. Under Lopez, a statute without such a statement still would stand under the Conumerce Clause, if the law satisfied
the substantial effects test. The court held that CERCLA is valid as applied in this case, because it regulates a class of activities that
substantially affects interstate commerce. "In our view, the disposal of hazardous waste at the site of production, or "on-site," constitutes
the narrowest, possible class." Olin Corp., 107 F.3d at 1510.
I addressing the retroactivity issue, the court stated that the district court's ruling not only conflicts vith the Eleventh Circuit's recent
description of CERCLA, but also is contrary to all other decisions on point. The court conducted an analysis of CERCLA's language,
structure and legislative history, and found clear Congressional intent that the statute impose retroactive liability for cleanup. Id.
For these reasons, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its
opinion. Id.
'"Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1507.
'18925 F. Supp. 691 (D. Nev. 1996). hI Nevada, the Nevada Department of Transportation and others brought an action under CERCLA
against the owners of property whose predecessors in interest were allegedly responsible for dumping hazardous materials on property
which Plaintiff had acquired as a highway right-of-way. The alleged contamination occurred many years before CERCLA's effective date,
therefore, a retroactive application ofCERCLA was required to establish liability against the Defendants. 1d. at 691-692.
91d. at 691.
1936 F. Supp. 545 (S.D. Ill. 1996). It should be noted that this opinion was handed downii after the Olin decision.
16101in, 927 F. Supp. at 1512.
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Shell and Nevada courts stressed the
importance of CERCLA in responding
to the problems associated with existing
hazardous waste dumps which were not
addressed by RCRA. The Nevada court
concluded that "consistent with
CERCLA's statutory scheme and
embedded in the statute is the undeniable
purpose of reaching past conduct and
imposing liability, in the form of
response costs, against those parties
responsible for past environmental
contamination."19
A fair and objective analysis of
CERCLA with regard to its statutory
language, legislative history and indeed
its entire purpose indicates that it is to
have retroactive effect. The Olin court
selectively addressed the evidence in
favor of retroactivity and reached a
conclusion based on a narrow view of
Landgraf
It is important. as the Landgraf
court stressed. to apply the presumption
against the retroactive application of
statutes. If Congress intends for a
statute to affect conduct completed in
the past, then Congress should specify
the statute's reach. The failure of
Congress to provide for clarifying
language in CERCLA has been rightly
criticized.7 0 However. as noted in
Landgraf where there is clear evidence
of Congressional intent, the traditional
presumption against retroactivity can be
overcome. Based on the evidence set
forth in cases both before and after
Landgraf there is sufficient evidence to
establish Congressional intent to apply
CERCLA retroactively.
2. Commerce Clause
The Olin court devoted most
of its analysis to the retroactivity issue.
However, the court dealt a second blow
by holding that under the present set of
facts. CERCLA violated the Commerce
Clause under the Supreme Court's
interpretation in Lopez.
The Olin court's decision that
CERCLA violated the Commerce
Clause was based on the fact that
CERCLA contained no jurisdictional
element which would ensure through a
case-by-case inquiry that the statute
affects interstate commerce."' In
addition, the Olin court found it doubtful
that the object of the regulation in the
Olin case was economic activity as
referred to by Lopez. In contrast, the
NI Industries court felt that improper
disposal of hazardous substances is an
economic activity.' The Olin court
based its conclusion on the fact that the
issue in Olin was a real property
question falling under the police power
of the states.'" The court also felt that
the contamination was confined to a
local area and would not cause any
contamination affecting interstate
commerce.'74
The Olin court focused on the
significance of the Lopez decision as
evidence that the Supreme Court is
ready to halt the expansion of
Congressional commerce power.
Although Lopez may be a dramatic
opinion, the Supreme Court specifically
reviewed its prior commerce clause
jurisprudence and upheld a variety of
Congressional Acts as having
substantially affected interstate
commerce.'"7
In addition, the Olin court's
conclusion that CERCLA is
unconstitutional because it does not
contain ajurisdictional statement_ which
would ensure through a case-by-case
inquiry that the statute affects interstate
commerce, is a misconstruction of
Lopez. The Lopez court specifically
stated that, "Congress normally is not
required to make formal findings as to
the substantial burdens that an activity
has on interstate commerce." 76 If such
a jurisdictional statement had been
required, the Lopez court would not
have made an inquiry into the legislative
findings related to interstate
commerce.' 77 As previously noted, the
Supreme Court has specifically dealt
with the issue of solid waste as an article
of commerce and has specifically held
that even valueless waste implicates
Constitutional protection. 7  The
disposal of waste. even if generated
entirely within the borders of one state.
affects interstate commerce, and thus is
subject to the Commerce Clause.'79
'"Nevada, 925 F. Supp. at 704
1'old. at 702. The Nevada court noted that CERCLA had received well-deserved criticism for the absence of an express retroactivity
provision.
7
'Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1532.
172 NL Indus., 936 F. Supp. at 563. "Pollution of surface water and groundwater affects the fishing industry, agriculture, livestock production,
recreation, and domestic and industrial water supplies. The consequences of clandestine waste dumps have been dramatically demonstrated
in places such as Love Canal and Times Beach, Missouri. In sum, CERCLA regulates economic activities which have a substantial affect
on interstate commerce."




, Indus., 936 F. Supp. at 556. See e.g., Ilodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assoc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981 )(regulation of
coal mining). Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (intrastate extortionate credit transactions - loan sharking); Katzenback v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (restaurants utilizing substantial interstate supplies). Heart of Atlanta Motel, hIc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964) (inns and hotels catering to interstate guests); Wickard V Filburn, 3 17 U.S. Ill (1942) (production and consumption of
home-grown wheat).
"'Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
"'AE Industries, 936 F. Supp. at 560.
"'City ofPhiladelphia, 437 U.S. at 617.
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Based on the findings of Congress
regarding CERCLA. the comprehensive
nature of CERCLA's statutory scheme.
and prior Supreme Court decisions
upholding environmental legislation as
substantially affecting interstate activity.
I do not think it can be said that
Congress has clearly exceeded its
commerce power."
VI. Conclusion
The decision in Olin has
created much interest in the validity of
CERCLA. CERCLA is an important
piece of legislation in the overall scope
of federal environmental legislation.
Therefore, it is frightening to many that
it could be destroyed or limited in its
application. The concerns raised by the
Olin court regarding retroactivity and
the Commerce Clause could have far
reaching implications on a variety of
federal statutes beyond CERCLA. The
stage has been set for perhaps the
Supreme Court to clarify the issues of
retroactivity and the reach of




"For another recent case specifically rejecting the Olin court's analysis, see Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Agway, Inc. 1996 WL 550128 (N.D.N.Y
Sept. 23, 1996). For further criticism of the Olin opinion, see MEALEY'S lInGAnON RErnwr: SUPERFUND,.June 27, 1996, House Commetre
Committee Democrats Criticize U.S. i Olin Decision.
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